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Abstract 
Recessions are generated by various shocks. In particular, if fundamental shocks change 
the steady state, severe recessions will be generated. In this paper, I show that when such 
a shock occurs, it is possible for households to rationally select a Nash equilibrium 
consisting of a Pareto inefficient transition path to the new steady state in an economy in 
which households behave according to a procedure that is not based on the expected 
utilities discounted by the rate of time preference. They select this path because they are 
non-cooperative and risk averse and want to reach what I call the “maximum degree of 
comfortability” or MDC. The MDC mechanism behind choosing a Pareto inefficient path 
is basically the same as that in an economy in which households behave according to the 
usually assumed procedure based on the rational expectations hypothesis.   
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Recessions are generated by various shocks (e.g., Rebelo, 2005; Blanchard, 2009; Ireland, 
2011; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2012; McGrattan and Prescott, 2014; Hall, 2016). In 
particular, if a fundamental shock or shocks cause the steady state to move downwards, a 
severe recession will be generated. When the steady state is changed downwards by such 
a shock, households must change their consumption path to the one on which 
consumption diminishes towards the lower level corresponding to the posterior steady 
state. This means that the growth rate becomes negative; that is, a recession begins. 
However, this description of recession raises a question. Pareto efficiency can be 
maintained only if households largely and immediately (i.e., discontinuously) increase 
their consumption from that of the prior steady state to a point on the posterior saddle 
path at the time when the shock occurs, even if they know that the level of consumption 
at the posterior steady state is lower than before. Do households actually increase 
consumption largely and abruptly to maintain Pareto efficiency even though they well 
know that they must soon begin to decrease it? 
 Harashima (2004, 2009, 2012a, 2018a, 2019b) showed a mechanism by which 
households do not suddenly increase (“jump” up) their consumption when these shocks 
occur because they are intrinsically risk averse and non-cooperative. In a strategic 
situation after such a shock occurs, the possibility exists that risk averse and non-
cooperative households choose a Pareto inefficient path (a “Nash equilibrium of a Pareto 
inefficient path”).  
 However, Harashima’s model is constructed on the basis of the rational 
expectations hypothesis, which has been predominant in economics since it was 
popularized by Lucas (1972) and Sargent et al. (1973), both of whose papers were based 
on that of Muth (1961). However, the idea of rational expectations has been criticized for 
imposing substantial demands on economic agents. To generate rational expectations, 
households are assumed to do something equivalent to computing complex large-scale 
non-linear dynamic macro-econometric models. Can a household routinely do such a 
thing in normal daily life? Evans and Honkapohja (2001) argued that this problem can be 
solved by introducing a learning mechanism (see also, e.g., Marcet and Sargent, 1989; 
Ellison and Pearlman, 2011), but this solution is not necessarily regarded as being 
sufficiently successful because arbitrary learning rules have to be assumed. 
 Harashima (2018b, 2019a) presented an alternative procedure for a household to 
reach steady state (the maximum degree of comfortability [MDC]-based procedure), 
which does not necessitate using the rational expectations hypothesis. This alternative 
procedure is very simple. A household only has to subjectively estimate its self-assessed 
value of the combination of its earned (labor) income and wealth (capital) as measured 
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by the wage-to-capital ratio (CWR). It then adjusts its consumption to the point at which 
it feels most comfortable (its MDC). A household is not required to do anything 
equivalent to computing a complex model to generate rational expectations, and 
furthermore, it is not even required to be aware of any sort of economic model. Moreover, 
households naturally reach a steady state that can be interpreted as the same steady state 
reached by the conventionally assumed procedure that relies on generating rational 
expectations based on the rate of time preference (RTP), which I refer to as the “RTP-
based procedure” in this paper. 
 The purpose of this paper is to examine the mechanism of recession in an 
economy in which households behave according to the MDC-based procedure. I show 
that the mechanism under the MDC-based procedure works basically in the same manner 
as that under the RTP-based procedure shown in Harashima (2004, 2009, 2012a, 2018a, 
2019b). When a shock on MDC occurs, each household has to adjust its capital (wealth) 
to satisfy its new MDC. However, because households are risk averse and non-
cooperative and therefore behave strategically, they make their decisions based on 
strategic considerations. As a result, a Pareto inefficient process of capital adjustment 
after the shock can be chosen by households.  
 Although the mechanisms under the MDC- and RTP-based procedures work 
basically in the same manner, there is an important difference between them. The 
expected utilities need to be discounted by RTP under the RTP-based procedure, but they 
need not be under the MDC-based procedure.  
 
2  MDC-BASED PROCEDURE 
 
The MDC-based procedure is explained in brief in this section on the basis of Harashima 
(2019a). 
 
2.1  “Comfortability” of CWR 
Let kt and wt be the capital and wage (labor income) per capita, respectively, in period t. 
Under the MDC-based procedure, a household should first subjectively evaluate the value 
of 
?̆?𝑡?̆?𝑡 , where ?̆?𝑡 and ?̆?𝑡 are wt and kt of the household, respectively (i.e., how much 
labor income it earns and how much capital (wealth) it possesses). Let Γ be the subjective 
valuation of 
?̆?𝑡?̆?𝑡  by a household and Γi be the value of ?̆?𝑡?̆?𝑡  of household i (i = 1, 2, 3, …, 
M). The household should next assess whether it feels comfortable with its current Γ, that 
is, its combination of income and capital. “Comfortable” in this context means “at ease,” 
“not anxious,” and other related feelings.  
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 Let the “degree of comfortability” (DOC) represent how comfortable a 
household feels with its Γ. The higher the value of DOC, the more a household feels 
comfortable with its Γ. For each household, there will be a most comfortable CWR value 
because the household will feel less comfortable if CWR is either too high or too low. 
Therefore, for each household, a maximum DOC exists. Let ?̃? be a household’s state at 
which its DOC is the maximum (MDC), and let 𝛤(?̃?) be a household’s Γ when it is at ?̃?. 𝛤(?̃?) therefore indicates the Γ that gives a household its MDC, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) is household 
i’s Γi when it is at ?̃?𝑖. 
 
2.2  A homogeneous population 
I first examine the behavior of households in a homogeneous population, that is, the case 
where all households are identical. 
 
2.2.1  Rules  
Household i should act according to the following rules:  
 
Rule 1-1: If household i feels that the current Γi is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it maintains the same 
level of consumption for any i.  
Rule 1-2: If household i feels that the current Γi is not equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it adjusts its level 
of consumption until it feels that Γi is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) for any i. 
 
2.2.2  Steady state  
Households can reach a steady state even if they behave only according to Rules 1-1 and 
1-2. Let St be the state of the entire economy in period t, and 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) be the value of 𝑤𝑡𝑘𝑡  
of the entire economy at St (i.e., the economy’s average CWR). In addition, let ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 be 
the steady state at which MDC is achieved and kept constant by all households, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶. Let also ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃 be the steady state in a Ramsey-type 
growth model in which households discount utilities by θ where θ (> 0) is the RTP of a 
household, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃.  
 
Proposition 1: If households behave according to Rules 1-1 and 1-2, and if the value of 
θ that is calculated from the values of variables at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 is used as the value of θ in the 
Ramsey-type growth model, then 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) = 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃).     
Proof: See Harashima (2018b, 2019a).  
 
Proposition 1 indicates that we can interpret that ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 is equivalent to ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃. This means 
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that the MDC-based and RTP-based procedures can function equivalently and that MDC 
is substitutable for RTP as a guide for household behavior.  
 
2.3  A heterogeneous population 
In actuality, households are not identical—they are heterogeneous—and if heterogeneous 
households behave unilaterally, there is no guarantee that a steady state other than corner 
solutions exists (Becker, 1980; Harashima, 2010, 2012b, 2017). However, Harashima 
(2010, 2012b, 2017) showed that a sustainable heterogeneity (SH), at which all optimality 
conditions of all heterogeneous households are simultaneously satisfied, exists under the 
RTP-based procedure. Moreover, Harashima (2018b, 2019a) showed that SH also exists 
under the MDC-based procedure, but Rules 1-1 and 1-2 have to be revised and a rule for 
the government should be added in a heterogeneous population.  
 Suppose that households are heterogeneous in MDC and for simplicity that they 
are identical except for MDC. Let ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 be the steady state at which MDC is achieved 
and kept constant by any household (i.e., SH in a heterogeneous population under the 
MDC-based procedure), and let 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻. In addition, 
let ΓR be a household’s numerically adjusted value of Γ for SH based on the information 
it has about its estimated values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻). Specifically, let ΓR,i be ΓR of household 
i, and let T be the net transfer that a household receives from the government with regard 
to SH. Specifically, let Ti be the net transfer that household i receives (i = 1,2,3, …, M). 
 
2.3.1  Revised and additional rules 
Household i should act according to the following rules in a heterogeneous population:  
 
Rule 2-1: If household i feels that the current ΓR,i is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it maintains the same 
level of consumption as before for any i. 
Rule 2-2: If household i feels that the current ΓR,i is not equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it adjusts its level 
of consumption or revises its estimated value of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) so that it perceives that ΓR,i 
is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) for any i.  
 
At the same time, a government should act according to the following rule:  
 
Rule 3: The government adjusts Ti for some i if necessary so as to make the number of 
votes cast in response to increases in the level of economic inequality equivalent to that 
cast in response to decreases in economic inequality in elections. 
 
2.3.2  Steady state  
 5 
Even if households and the government behave according to Rules 2-1, 2-2, and 3, there 
is no guarantee that the economy can reach ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 . However, thanks to the 
government’s intervention, SH can be approximately achieved. Let ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 be the 
state at which ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 is approximately achieved (see Harashima, 2018b, 2019a) and 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡)  at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝  on average. Here, let ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻  be the steady 
state that satisfies SH under the RTP-based procedure when households are identical 
except for their RTPs, and let 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻. 
 
Proposition 2: If households are identical except for their values of 𝛤(?̃?) and behave 
unilaterally according to Rules 2-1 and 2-2, if the government behaves according to Rule 
3, and if the value of θi that is calculated back from the values of variables at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 
is used as the value of θi for any i under the RTP-based procedure in which households 
are identical except for their RTPs, then 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝) = 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻).  
Proof: See Harashima (2018b, 2019a).  
 
Proposition 2 indicates that we can interpret that ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 is equivalent to ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻. No 
matter what values of T, ΓR, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) are severally estimated by households, any ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 can be interpreted as the objectively correct and true steady state. In addition, 
a government need not necessarily provide the objectively correct Ti for ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 even 
though the ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 is interpreted as objectively correct and true. 
 
2.4  “Undiscounted” utility  
Although households do not use RTP (more precisely, they cannot know their “correct” 
and “true” values of RTP) under the MDC-based procedure, they still behave considering 
the utilities they obtain from consumption. A household’s utility v is a function of c, which 
measures the level of current or future consumption estimated by a household. It is 
important to note that c is simply an estimated value, and it is not discounted by RTP. For 
simplicity, a typical constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function is assumed 
such that   
   v = 𝑐1−𝛾1 − 𝛾       if 𝛾 ≠ 1  
(1) 
v = ln 𝑐         if 𝛾 = 1 
 
and thereby  
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  𝛾 = − 𝑐 𝑑2v𝑑𝑐2𝑑v𝑑𝑐 (> 0) . 
 
3  MDC SHOCK 
 
3.1  Shock on the estimated 𝜞(?̃?𝑴𝑫𝑪,𝑺𝑯)  
3.1.1  Vulnerability of ?̃?𝑴𝑫𝑪,𝑺𝑯,𝒂𝒑 ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 crucially depends on the estimated values of a few variables, in particular, 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻), T, and ΓR. Because these values are generally estimated with incomplete 
information, ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 is vulnerable to various shocks and can occasionally fluctuate 
widely. Vulnerabilities will emerge because of the following factors.   
 
 Limited information: A household can access only limited information about 
various aspects of the economy to estimate these values through its own direct 
experiences. In addition, publicly disseminated information will not necessarily 
be comprehensive, and more importantly, it may not necessarily be correct and 
may even be purposefully misleading or incorrect. 
 Permanent capital and income: The value of CWR should be modified by 
removing any temporal elements, but this modification may not be easy.  
 Capital or wealth: Conceptually, CWR should be the ratio of labor income to 
capital, not wealth. However, it seems likely that many households would use 
wealth as a substitute for capital, but the prices of various kinds of wealth fluctuate 
more widely and frequently than both the general price level and the price of 
capital. 
 
3.1.2  Revision of the estimated values of 𝜞(?̃?𝑴𝑫𝑪,𝑺𝑯) 
Because of these vulnerabilities, households will occasionally revise their estimated 
values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻), T, and ΓR when new pieces of information arrive or some kinds of 
shocks are recognized. In some cases, the estimated values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) of many 
households may be simultaneously revised. I call this kind of phenomenon a “MDC 
shock.” 
 Suppose, for example, that because of some new information that becomes 
simultaneously known to all households, the estimated values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻)  of all 
households are simultaneously revised upward, and all households perceive this 
simultaneous revision. Because of the increases in the estimated values of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻), 
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households begin to estimate that wt and the net transfers they receive in the future from 
the government will become smaller than they had previously estimated. In other words, 
they begin to feel poorer. Because they begin to estimate smaller incomes while the 
amounts of capital remain unchanged, households begin to feel that their current values 
of ΓR are smaller than previously estimated. Therefore, they begin to adjust the values of 
ΓR upward to make them equal to their values of 𝛤(?̃?)  by adjusting consumption 
according to Rule 2-2. 
 Adjusting the value of ΓR upward means that part of a household’s accumulated 
capital has become excessive and must be reduced, but how can it be reduced? One 
possibility is that a household temporarily increases its consumption by a large amount to 
reduce its accumulated capital (following Rule 2-2). However, it seems unlikely that a 
household would do so because it now feels poorer than it did before lowering its 
estimated future income. In addition, an individual household may act differently from 
other households because it estimates a different new 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) and thereby also a 
different lower future income. Because households are non-cooperative with regard to 
consumption, they will behave strategically after an MDC shock, considering the actions 
taken by other households. Because the overall process of capital reduction in the 
economy will differ depending on how each household acts, the impact of simultaneous 
revisions on a household will differ depending not only on its own action but also on the 
actions of other households.  
 
3.2  Strategic behaviors and options 
For simplicity, I examine the effect of a MDC shock in a homogeneous population; that 
is, I assume that all households are identical and they behave according to Rules 1-1 and 
1-2, not Rules 2-1 and 2-2. In a homogeneous population, a MDC shock is equivalent to 
a shock on 𝛤(?̃?) because 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) = 𝛤(?̃?) and is identical for all households. Note, 
however, that even if the effect of a MDC shock is examined in the framework of a 
heterogeneous population, the result is basically the same as that in the framework of a 
homogeneous population because each household is “linked” via ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝  in a 
heterogeneous population. Harashima (2018b, 2019a) showed that, because of these links, 
all heterogeneous households respond to a shock in the same manner, and that the 
structure of the links at the posterior ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 is almost same as that at the previous ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 . Therefore, the effect of a MDC shock is basically the same whether a 
homogeneous or heterogeneous population is assumed.  
 Households are risk averse as described by equation (1), behave non-
cooperatively, and determine their actions strategically after a MDC shock in a similar 
manner to that described by Harashima (2004, 2009, 2012a, 2018a, 2019b) for the case 
of a RTP shock under the RTP-based procedure. Suppose that an upward MDC shock 
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occurs; that is, the 𝛤(?̃?)  of all households is simultaneously changed upward. It is 
assumed for simplicity that there are two options for each household with regard to 
consumption just after the shock. The first is a jump option (J), in which a household 
immediately increases its consumption largely to reduce its capital. If most households 
choose option J, the amount of capital in the economy steadily decreases to the level 
consistent with the new 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶). In this case, no resources are wasted or destroyed 
thanks to the increased consumption. The second option is non-jump (NJ), in which a 
household does not increase its consumption but instead decreases it directly to the level 
consistent with the new 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶). If all households choose the NJ option, large amounts 
of resources are simply destroyed to reduce capital. The difference of the level of 
consumption during the transition period to the new 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) between the J and NJ 
options is measured by b (> 0), and therefore the level of consumption in the case of J is 
higher than that of NJ by b during the transition.   
 Although all households are identical, the choice a household makes after the 
shock can be different from that of other households because they are non-cooperative 
and behave strategically. Let Jalone indicate that a household chooses the J option but 
the other households choose the NJ option, NJalone indicate that the household chooses 
the NJ option but the other households choose the J option, Jtogether indicate that all 
households choose the J option, and NJtogether indicate that all households choose the 
NJ option. It is assumed that, when a household chooses a different option from that of 
the other households, the difference in the accumulation of financial assets resulting from 
the difference in consumption during the transition period to the new 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶)  is 
reflected in consumption after reaching the new 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶). That is, the difference in the 
return on financial assets is added to (or subtracted from) the household’s consumption 
after reaching the new 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶). 
 
4  RATIONAL CHOICE OF A PARETO 
INEFFICIENT PATH  
 
4.1  Undiscounted utility after an upward MDC shock 
As noted in Section 2.4, future utility is not discounted by RTP under the MDC-based 
procedure, and households estimate only “undiscounted” future utilities. 
 
4.1.1  Undiscounted utility 
4.1.1.1  Undiscounted utility in the case of NJtogether 
Let 𝑐̅ be the level of consumption for a household after an upward MDC shock in the 
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case of NJtogether. In this case, the undiscounted utility that a household estimates is 
described as ṽ(𝑐̅) both during the transition period to the new ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 and after reaching 
the new ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶. 
 
4.1.1.2  Undiscounted utility during the transition in the case of NJalone 
The undiscounted utility during the transition in the case of NJalone is also ṽ(𝑐̅) because 
the level of consumption (𝑐̅) during the transition period is the same as that in the case of 
NJtogether. 
 
4.1.1.3  Undiscounted utility during the transition in the case of Jtogether and 
Jalone 
Choosing option J (Jtogether or Jalone) indicates that a household experiences a higher 
level of consumption during the transition period by b (> 0) than it does in the case of 
choosing option NJ as discussed in Section 3.2. Hence, the undiscounted utilities in the 
cases of Jtogether and Jalone during the transition period are both estimated to be ṽ(𝑐̅ +𝑏). 
 
4.1.1.4  Undiscounted utility after reaching the new ?̃?𝑴𝑫𝑪 in the case of Jtogether 
The undiscounted utility after reaching the new ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 in the case of Jtogether is ṽ(𝑐̅) 
because no household has extra capital after reaching the new ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 (as is also the case 
with NJtogether). Therefore, the level of consumption after a household reaches the new ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 is the same 𝑐̅ as in the case of NJtogether. 
 
4.1.1.5  Undiscounted utility after reaching the new ?̃?𝑴𝑫𝑪 in the case of Jalone 
If a household chooses Jalone, it accumulates fewer financial assets because of its greater 
consumption as compared with the NJ households. As a result, it reduces consumption 
by ?̅? from 𝑐̅ after reaching the new ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 because it has a smaller amount of financial 
assets, as assumed in Section 3.2. Hence, the undiscounted utility after reaching the new ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 in the case of NJalone is estimated to be ṽ(𝑐̅ − ?̅?). 
 
4.1.1.6  Undiscounted utility after reaching the new ?̃?𝑴𝑫𝑪 in the case of NJalone 
If a household chooses NJalone, it accumulates more financial assets because of the 
difference in consumption as compared to J households. As a result, it consumes ?̅? in 
addition to 𝑐̅ using the extra accumulated financial assets after reaching the new ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶, 
as assumed in Section 3.2. Hence, the undiscounted utility in the case of NJalone after 
the household reaches the new ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 is estimated to be ṽ(𝑐̅ + ?̅?). 
 For this discussion, I assume that 0 < ?̅? < 𝑏 and therefore ṽ(𝑐̅ + 𝑏) > ṽ(𝑐̅ +?̅?). Note, however, that even if the assumption is 0 < 𝑏 < ?̅?, the main conclusion of this 
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paper does not change (see Section 4.3.2).   
 
4.1.2  The undiscounted utility in each case  
The undiscounted utilities a household estimates are summarized below:  
 
                  During the transition         After reaching the new ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶  
    Jtogether:          ṽ(𝑐̅ + 𝑏)                      ṽ(𝑐̅) 
    NJtogether:          ṽ(𝑐̅)                        ṽ(𝑐̅)  
    NJalone:            ṽ(𝑐̅)                      ṽ(𝑐̅ + ?̅?) 
    Jalone:             ṽ(𝑐̅ + 𝑏)                    ṽ(𝑐̅ − ?̅?) 
 
 Let 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) , 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) , 𝐸(𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) , and 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟)  be the 
undiscounted utilities of Jalone, NJalone, Jtogether, and NJtogether, respectively, that 
are estimated by a household. Based on the results shown above, their values can be 
defined as:  
 
 𝐸(𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) =  ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) + ṽ(𝑐̅)                                     (2) 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) = ṽ(𝑐̅) + ṽ(𝑐̅)                                           (3) 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) = ṽ(𝑐̅) + ṽ (𝑐̅ + ?̅?)                                          (4) 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) = ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) + ṽ (𝑐̅ − ?̅?) .                                    (5) 
 
4.1.3  Undiscounted utilities for the J and NJ options 
Let 𝐸(𝐽) and 𝐸(𝑁𝐽) be the undiscounted utilities estimated by a household if it chooses 
the J and NJ options, respectively. Let also 𝑝(0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 1) be the subjective probability 
of a household that all the other households choose option J (e.g., 𝑝 = 0 indicates that 
all the other households choose option NJ). With p, the undiscounted utility estimated by 
a household choosing option J is  
 𝐸(𝐽) = 𝑝𝐸(𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) + (1 − 𝑝)𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) ,             (6) 
 
and the undiscounted utility estimated by a household choosing option NJ is 
 𝐸(𝑁𝐽) = 𝑝𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) + (1 − 𝑝)𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) .           (7) 
 
4.2  Rational choice of the NJ option 
4.2.1  Choice between 𝑬(𝑱) and 𝑬(𝑵𝑱) 
A household’s decision on whether to choose option J or NJ is determined based on the 
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values of 𝐸(𝐽) and 𝐸(𝑁𝐽). If 𝐸(𝐽) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽) > 0, the J option will be chosen, but if 𝐸(𝐽) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽) < 0, the NJ option will be chosen. By equations (6) and (7),   
    𝐸(𝐽) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽)  = 𝑝[𝐸(𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒)] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟)]. (8) 
 
 Here, because 𝑏 > ?̅?, by equations (2) and (4),  
  𝐸(𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) = ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) − ṽ (𝑐̅ + ?̅?) > 0 . 
 
That is, always 
 𝐸(𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) > 0 .                  (9) 
 
 On the other hand, by equations (3) and (5),  
 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) = ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) − ṽ(𝑐̅) + ṽ (𝑐̅ − ?̅?) − ṽ(𝑐̅) .   (10) 
 
Because  
 
ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) − ṽ(𝑐̅) > 0 and 
                         ṽ (𝑐̅ − ?̅?) − ṽ(𝑐̅) < 0 
 
for any 𝛾(> 0) by equation (1), the sign of 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) will differ 
depending on the value of parameter 𝛾. As a result, by equation (8), the sign of 𝐸(𝐽) −𝐸(𝑁𝐽) will also differ depending on the value of 𝛾.  
 
4.2.2  Positive probability of choosing option NJ  
Here, 
 lim𝛾→∞ {1 − 𝛾𝑐1̅−𝛾 [ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) − ṽ(𝑐̅)]} = lim𝛾→∞ ( 𝑐̅𝑐̅ + 𝑏)𝛾−1 − 1 = −1 
 
and  
  lim𝛾→∞ {1 − 𝛾𝑐̅ 1−𝛾 [ṽ (𝑐̅ − ?̅?) − ṽ(𝑐̅)]} = lim𝛾→∞ ( 𝑐̅𝑐̅ − ?̅?)𝛾−1 − 1 = +∞ . 
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Therefore, 
  lim𝛾→∞ 1 − 𝛾𝑐̅ 1−𝛾[ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) − ṽ(𝑐̅) + ṽ (𝑐̅ − ?̅?) − ṽ(𝑐̅)] = +∞ . 
 
Because lim𝛾→∞ 1−𝛾?̅?1−𝛾 < 0,  
 lim𝛾→∞[ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) − ṽ(𝑐̅) + ṽ (𝑐̅ − ?̅?) − ṽ(𝑐̅)] < 0 ,            (11) 
 
and thereby, by equation (10) and inequality (11), 
   lim𝛾→∞[𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟)] < 0 . 
 
 On the other hand, because 𝑏 > ?̅?, 
 lim𝛾→0[?̃?  (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) − ?̃?(𝑐̅) + ?̃?  (𝑐̅ − ?̅?) − ?̃?(𝑐̅)] = 𝑏 − ?̅? > 0          (12) 
 
and thereby, by equation (10) and inequality (12), 
  lim𝛾→0[𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟)] > 0 . 
 
Lemma 1: If 𝛾 is sufficiently small, 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) > 0.  
Proof: Because lim𝛾→0{ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) − ṽ(𝑐̅) + ṽ (𝑐̅ − ?̅?) − ṽ(𝑐̅)} > 0  as indicated by 
inequality (12), then by equation (10), if 𝛾(> 0) is sufficiently small, 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) −𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) > 0.                                                    ■ 
 
Lemma 2: If 𝛾 is sufficiently large, 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) < 0.  
Proof: Because lim𝛾→∞[ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) − ṽ(𝑐̅) + ṽ (𝑐̅ − ?̅?) − ṽ(𝑐̅)] < 0  as indicated by 
inequality (11), then by equation (10), if 𝛾  is sufficiently large, 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) −𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) < 0.                                                    ■ 
 
 Lemmas 1 and 2 indicate that if 𝛾 is larger than a critical value, 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) −𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) < 0.    
 
Lemma 3: There is a 𝛾∗(> 0) such that if 𝛾∗ < 𝛾, 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) < 0. 
Proof: If 𝛾(> 0)  is sufficiently small, then 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) > 0  by 
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Lemma 1, and if 𝛾  is sufficiently large, then 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) < 0 by 
Lemma 2. Hence, there is a certain 𝛾∗(> 0)  such that, if 𝛾∗ < 𝛾 , 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) −𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) < 0.                                                    ■ 
 
 Lemma 3 and Equation (8) indicate that, for some values of p, the inequality 𝐸(𝐽) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽) < 0 will be true. 
 
Proposition 1: If 𝛾∗ < 𝛾, then there is a p* (0 ≤ p* ≤ 1) such that if p = p*, 𝐸(𝐽) −𝐸(𝑁𝐽) = 0, and if p < p*, 𝐸(𝐽) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽) < 0. 
Proof: By equation (8), 𝐸(𝐽) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽) = 𝑝[𝐸(𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒)] + (1 −𝑝)[𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟)] . Here, 𝐸(𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) > 0  always 
holds as inequality (9) indicates. On the other hand, by Lemma 3, if 𝛾∗ < 𝛾 , 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) < 0 . Therefore, if 𝛾∗ < 𝛾 , lim𝑝→0 𝐸(𝐽) − E(𝑁𝐽) < 0  and lim𝑝→1 𝐸(𝐽) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽) > 0 . Hence, by the intermediate value theorem, there is a 
 10   pp  such that if p = p*, 𝐸(𝐽) − E(𝑁𝐽) = 0, and if p < p*, 𝐸(𝐽) − E(𝑁𝐽) < 0. 
                                                                    ■ 
 
If p is sufficiently small for a household (i.e., if the household estimates that the other 
households will most likely not choose option J), the household does not choose option 
J (i.e., jump its consumption). 
 Proposition 1 is the same as the case of an upward RTP shock under the RTP-
based procedure of Harashima (2004, 2009, 2012a, 2018a, 2019b).  
 
4.3  Selection of Nash equilibrium  
4.3.1  Nash equilibria 
A household strategically determines whether to choose the J or NJ option considering 
other households’ choices. Particularly, the choice depends on how it estimates the value 
of p.  
 Because all households are identical, the best response of each household is also 
identical. In addition, all households know that each of them uses the same process to 
make a choice. Suppose that there are 𝐻(∈ 𝑁) households in the economy, where H is 
sufficiently large. Let 𝑞𝜂(0 ≤ 𝑞𝜂 ≤ 1)  be the probability that household 𝜂(∈ 𝐻) 
chooses option J. Because H is sufficiently large, the average undiscounted utility of the 
other households almost equals that of all households, and therefore the average 
undiscounted utility of the other households that choose the J and NJ options are 𝐸(𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) and 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟). Hence, the payoff matrix of the Η-dimensional 
symmetric mixed-strategy game can be described as shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1: The payoff matrix for the mixed-strategy game when choosing a 
consumption option (J or NJ) 
 
                   Any other household 
  J  NJ  
A
 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
      
J  𝐸(𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟), 𝐸(𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒), 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) 
      
NJ  𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒), 𝐸(𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟), 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) 
 
 Each household determines its behavior on the basis of this payoff matrix. In this 
mixed-strategy game, strategy profiles  
 
(q1,q2,…,qH) = {(1,1,…,1), (p*, p*,…, p*), (0,0,…,0)} 
 
are Nash equilibria for the following reason. By Proposition 1, the best response of 
household η is J (i.e., qη = 1) if p > p*, it is indifferent between J and NJ (i.e., any 𝑞𝜂 ∈[0, 1]) if p = p*, and it chooses NJ (i.e., qη = 0) if p < p*. Because all households are 
identical, the best-response correspondence of each household is identical such that qη = 
{1} if p > p*, [0,1] if p = p*, and {0} if p < p* for any household 𝜂 ∈ 𝐻. Hence, the mixed-
strategy profiles (1, 1,…,1), (p*, p*,…, p*), and (0,0,…,0) are the intersections of the graph 
of the best-response correspondences of all households. Jtogether (1,1,…,1) and 
NJtogether  (0,0,…,0) are pure strategy Nash equilibria, and the strategy profile (p*, 
p*,…, p*) is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.  
 
4.3.2  Selecting NJtogether equilibrium 
Determining which Nash equilibrium, either NJtogether (0,0,…,0) or Jtogether 
(1,1,…,1), is dominant requires a refinement of the Nash equilibrium, which necessitates 
additional criteria. Here, suppose that households have a worst-case aversion preference 
in the sense that they avoid options that include the worst-case scenario when its 
probability is not known.  
 By equations (4) and (5),  
 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) = ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) − ṽ (𝑐̅ + ?̅?) −  ṽ(𝑐̅) + ṽ (𝑐̅ − ?̅?) ,   (13) 
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where ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) − ṽ (𝑐̅ + ?̅?) > 0 and −ṽ(𝑐̅) + ṽ (𝑐̅ − ?̅?) < 0.  
 
By Lemma 3, if 𝛾∗ < 𝛾, 
 
ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) − ṽ(𝑐̅) < ṽ(𝑐̅) − ṽ (𝑐̅ − ?̅?) .                (14) 
 
Because  
  ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) − ṽ (𝑐̅ + ?̅?) < ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) − ṽ(𝑐̅) ,  
 
then, by inequality (14), if 𝛾∗ < 𝛾, 
 
ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) − ṽ (𝑐̅ + ?̅?) < ṽ(𝑐̅) − ṽ (𝑐̅ − ?̅?).              (15) 
 
Hence, by equation (13) and inequality (15), if 𝛾∗ < 𝛾, 
 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) < 0 .                  (16) 
 
On the other hand, by equations (3) and (4),  
 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) = ṽ (𝑐̅ + ?̅?) − ṽ(𝑐̅) > 0 .        (17) 
 
In addition, by Lemma 3, if 𝛾∗ < 𝛾, 
 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) − 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) < 0 .                 (18) 
 
In sum, if 𝛾∗ < 𝛾, by inequalities (9), (16), (17), and (18), 
 𝐸(𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) > 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) .     (19) 
 
This means that Jalone is the worst choice, followed by NJtogether and NJalone, and 
that Jtogether is the best.  
 The reason why inequality (19) holds is illustrated in Figure 1. As compared with 
the undiscounted utility in the case of NJtogether (ṽ(𝑐̅) + ṽ(𝑐̅)), the utility in the case of 
Jtogether (ṽ (𝑐̅ + 𝑏) + ṽ(𝑐̅)) is larger. It is also larger than that in the case of NJalone 
ṽ(𝑐̅) + ṽ(𝑐̅ + ?̅?)), but not by quite as much. In the case of Jalone (ṽ(𝑐̅ + 𝑏) + ṽ(𝑐̅ − ?̅?)), 
the undiscounted utility is much smaller, particularly after reaching the new ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 , 
although it is larger during the transition period.  
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Figure 1: Increases and decreases in undiscounted utilities from ṽ (?̅?) 
when 𝜸 is sufficiently large 
 
Jtogether 
  Increase 
 
 
  Decrease 
 
NJalone 
  Increase 
 
 
  Decrease 
 
NJtogether 
  Increase 
 
 
  Decrease 
 
Jalone  
  Increase 
  
 
  Decrease 
 
 
 
           During the transition  After reaching the new ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶        Total 
                  (A)                  (B)                  (A) + (B) 
 
 
 If households have a worst-case aversion preference as assumed above and avoid 
the option that includes the worst-case scenario when they have no information on its 
probability, a household will prefer the NJ option, in avoidance of the possible worst-
case situation (i.e., Jalone). Since all households are identical and know the order of 
preference shown by inequality (19), all households will equally suppose that they all 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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prefer the NJ option; therefore, all of them will suppose a very low p, particularly p = 0, 
and select the NJtogether (0,0,…,0) equilibrium. This result is the same as that in the 
case of an upward RTP shock under the RTP-based procedure of Harashima (2004, 2009, 
2012a, 2018a, 2019b).  
 Note that if 0 < 𝑏 < ?̅? (not 0 < ?̅? < 𝑏), then if 𝛾∗ < 𝛾, 
  𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) > 𝐸(𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) > 𝐸(𝑁𝐽𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) > 𝐸(𝐽𝑎𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑒) . 
 
Clearly, Jalone is still the worst choice, and all households will choose the NJ option 
even if 0 < 𝑏 < ?̅?. 
 
4.3.3  Persistently high unemployment rates  
NJtogether indicates that large amounts of resources (i.e., b) are simply destroyed during 
the transition period by leaving them unused, discarding them, or preemptively not 
producing them. Hence, Pareto efficiency is not satisfied during the transition. 
Nevertheless, households still take the NJtogether path because it is the best path. As a 
result, the economy falls into a recession or even depression, which is accompanied by 
persistently high unemployment rates (Harashima, 2012a, 2019b).  
 
4.4  Downward MDC shock 
What will happen in the case of a downward MDC shock, that is, if 𝛤(?̃?)  of all 
households is simultaneously changed downward? Suppose again that all households are 
identical and therefore 𝛤(?̃?) is identical among them. Because of the decrease in 𝛤(?̃?), 
households begin to estimate that wt will become larger in the future than previously 
estimated. In other words, they begin to feel richer and therefore to feel that the current 
value of Γ is larger than previously estimated. Hence, they begin to adjust the value of Γ 
downward to make it again equal to the value of 𝛤(?̃?)  by adjusting consumption. 
Adjusting the value of Γ downward means that capital must be increased. Households 
may decrease their consumption temporarily to increase their capital, but it seems unlikely 
that households decrease their consumption if they feel richer. Therefore, risk averse and 
non-cooperative households will instead begin to increase consumption after strategically 
considering the consequences of their choices. As a result, an economic boom will begin 
and capital and labor will begin to be overused.  
 
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Recessions are generated by various shocks. Particularly, if a fundamental shock changes 
the steady state, a severe recession will be generated. To keep Pareto efficiency after such 
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a shock, households have to discontinuously change their consumption. However, such 
discontinuous large changes in consumption seem to be very unlikely because households 
are intrinsically risk averse. Harashima (2004, 2009, 2012a, 2018a, 2019b) showed a 
mechanism by which risk averse and non-cooperative households do not change their 
consumption discontinuously when the steady state is changed as a result of strategic 
considerations. That is, in some strategic situations, risk averse and non-cooperative 
households strategically choose a “Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path.”  
 Harashima’s model is, however, constructed on the basis of the rational 
expectations hypothesis (i.e., the RTP-based procedure), but this hypothesis has been 
criticized for imposing substantial demands on economic agents. As an alternative, 
Harashima (2018b, 2019a) presented the MDC-based procedure, which also shows how 
households reach the steady state. In this paper, I showed a mechanism by which a Nash 
equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path is selected by households under the MDC-based 
procedure. This mechanism works basically in the same manner as that when households 
behave according to the RTP-based procedure. When a shock on CWR occurs, each 
household has to adjust its capital (wealth) to satisfy its MDC. However, because 
households are risk averse and non-cooperative and behave strategically, they make 
decisions based on strategic considerations. As a result, a Pareto inefficient process of 
capital adjustment after the shock can be chosen by households.  
 Although the mechanisms under the MDC- and RTP-based procedures are 
basically the same, there is an important difference between them. Household expected 
utilities have to be discounted by RTP under the RTP-based procedure, but they do not 
need to be discounted under the MDC-based procedure.  
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